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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

MARSHA DIANE RUSH,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Case No. 870092-CA

vs.
LARRY GENE RUSH,

)

Case Priority 14.b.

Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is a divorce action filed in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Defendant/Appellant appeals to this Court pursuant to U.C.A. 782a-3 (g) from a Decree of Divorce entered on February 10, 1987, by
the Honorable Richard H. Moffat.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding the
marital residence and real property to the wife?
II
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding the
1

wife alimony?
Ill
Did the trial court improperly order future termination of
defendant's visitation rights?
DETERMINATIVE OF STATUTES
Pursuant to Rule 24(a) (6) and (f) of the Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals, defendant/appellant has attached copies of the
following as an addendum to this brief:
1.

Memorandum Decision of the Honorable Richard H. Moffat,

dated December 18, 1986.
2.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on

February 10, 1987.
3.

Decree of Divorce entered on February 10, 1987.

4.

U.C.A. 30-3-5 (1) (1953) .

5.

U.C.A. 78-3a-48 (1953) .

6.

U.C.A. 78-3a-2(10), (14) (1953).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a divorce action which was commenced in July of
1985.

Trial was held on November 19 and 20, 1986, before the

Honorable Richard H. Moffat, who rendered a Memorandum Decision
on December 18, 1986.

From a Decree entered on February 10,

1987, defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on March 10, 1987.
The parties were married for twenty-one (21) years and had
2

three children (R.187).

The children's ages at the time of trial

were twelve (12), fifteen (15) and twenty (20) (R.187).

The

appellant/husband (hereinafter husband) was in a gyro-copter
accident in 1983, in which he sustained trauma to the brain and
skull (R.122).

This injury resulted in plaintiff having

cognitive/intellectual dysfunction including lack of emotional
control, decreased attention span, decreased ability to
concentrate, difficulty with abstract thinking, a word finding
difficulty problem, a time-concept problem, recent and remote
memory difficulties, geographic disorientation, speech
difficulties and fatiguability (R.136-7).

Prior to the accident,

husband was employed as a .mechanic with a monthly take-home pay
of $1,600.00 (R.195).

Husband's current total income consists of

$708.00 in Social Security benefits (R.206).
The respondent/wife (hereinafter wife) was employed at the
time of trial and earning $4.50 per hour (R.196).

Wife receives

$363.00 in Social Security benefits for the two (2) minor
children and for herself (R. 205, 217). Wife also received the
$500.00 per month rent from the properties' real property (R.186,
222).

Finally, the adult child of the parties resides with wife

and has an income of $325.00 per month (R.218).

The wife's

household income is therefore $1,942.00 per month.
The principal asset of the parties' marriage is real
3

property located at 13231 South State Street in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah (R.187) and the only evidence presented at trial as
to value was the sales price suggested by a realtor of $115,00.00
(R.169).

The debt on the real property is approximately

$25,000.00 (R.219).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by
awarding, as a practical matter, the entire marital estate to
wife.

Husband contends his disability as well wife's much

greater income mandates he be awarded a portion of the net
proceeds from the real property.

Moreover, the lower court did

not justify its ruling inasmuch as awarding the proceeds so that
wife and children could obtain housing ignores husband's
disability and housing needs.
Husband also contends the lower court erred in awarding
alimony to wife because wife presented no evidence on her need
nor on husband's ability to pay.

Further, husband being

permanently disabled is the more appropriate candidate for
spousal support given the wife's greater income.
Finally, the lower court's apparent imposition of automatic
termination of husband's visitation rights if husband's mother in
any way interferes is, in effect, a termination of parental
rights without a hearing.

Further, the visitation rights order
4

does not address the child's best interests or the nature of any
specific future conduct on the part of the mother and should be
modified to require an evidentiary hearing on those issues.
ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING THE
MARITAL RESIDENCE TO WIFE WITHOUT AWARDING A FAIR AND
EQUITABLE PORTION TO HUSBAND.
Admittedly, the trial court's division of property is
cloaked with a presumption of validity, Stephens v. Stephens, 728
P.2d 991 (Utah 1986) but such presumption evaporates when the
trial court fails to make findings of fact regarding the values
of property and the property division is challenged on appeal.
Boyle v. Boyle, 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 51,52 (Utah 1987) citing Jones
v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074-75 (Utah 1985).

In the case at

bar, the court made absolutely no findings as to value of the
parties1 real property in either its Memorandum Decision or its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

As such, we must turn

to the record in hopes of gleaning some evidence on this issue.
The only evidence concerning the value of real property is a
statement made by counsel that the property was listed for
$115,000.00.

Wife testified that the debt on the property was

approximately $25,000.00.

This evidence results in a net equity

position of $90,000.00, all of which the trial court awarded to
5

wife.

Although the court ordered pre-separation debts to be paid

from the sale of the property, no evidence was presented
indicating the amount of those debts.
Assuming, arguendo, that there exists $90,000.00 in equity,
did the court fairly and equitably divide the parties' assets?
Husband's position is a resounding NO I The parties' respective
incomes are approximately equal if you compare wife's wages
($754.00) with husband's Social Security benefits ($708.00).
Wife, however, also receives $363.00 in Social Security benefits,
$500.00 in rental income and has an adult child with a monthly
income of $325.00.

Wife's household income, therefore, totals

$1,942.00 which is more than double husband's income.

In light

of his disability, the chances for husband to ever increase his
financial position are very slim and to totally deprive him of
any portion of the marital estate is so fundamentally unfair and
unjust as to approach Constitutional magnitude.
Moreover, the trial judge's justification for awarding the
property to wife cannot be supported.

Specifically, the trial

court stated "the balance of the equity in said property is
awarded to the plaintiff for the purpose of her procuring housing
for her and the minor children".

Nowhere in its decision does

the court state why all of the equity is needed for wife's and
the children's housing.

Furthermore, the court did not address
6

the fact that husband would be required to obtain new housing.
Most certainly husband will need additional funds to obtain
housing by virtue of the sale of the marital residence.

The

lower court's justification for its award cannot therefore stand.
Although the Utah Supreme Court has affirmed an award of the
marital residence to one spouse in King v. King, 718 P.2d 779
(Utah 1986), that case is factually distinguishable from the case
at bar and is not controlling.

In King, the husband conveyed the

marital residence to his wife two and one-half (2 1/2) years
prior to the divorce proceedings.

The conveyance was purely

voluntary and without compulsion.

Moreover, the wife was

unemployed and without future opportunity for employment.

As a

result, the court held the award of the marital residence to be
within the sound discretion of the trial court.
In the present case, no conveyance of any interest has ever
occurred and wife is currently employed with a household income
far in excess of husband's income.

King is, therefore,

inapplicable.
Although wife's income exceeds husband's income, we admit
that her expenses incident to raising the two (2) minor children
may warrant something other than a fifty/fifty division of the
real property proceeds.

Husband therefore requests the court to

remand this matter to the trial court and award him twenty-five
7

percent (25%) of the net proceeds after sale of the property and
payment of all the expenses pursuant to the Decree.
II
THE AWARD OF ALIMONY IS WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.
An award of alimony must be supported by evidence and
findings of fact demonstrating the needs of the wife, her
inability to provide sufficient income for herself and the
husband's ability to pay, Jones supra, at 1075.

Moreover, the

purpose of alimony is to "equalize" the parties as close as
possible, Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 381 (Utah 1983) and
"avoid the necessity of one spouse receiving public assistance",
Boyle supra, at 52 (citing Higley).

See also English v. English,

565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977).
The trial court's only finding of fact regarding alimony is
found at paragraph 5:
"5. Defendant is permanently disabled and receives
Social Security benefits for himself, the spouse, and
the minor children. Plaintiff is able-bodied, and
employed, but does not have job training or skills..."
The trial court's findings do not address the issue of
wife's needs by comparing income with expenses.

One reason for

this deficiency is the fact that absolutely no evidence was
presented at trial on wife's monthly expenses.

As such, the

trial court could not have found her "needs" because the lower
8

court did not know what, in fact, those needs were.
Second, the trial court made no findings as to husband's
ability to pay, but did find him to be permanently disabled and
receiving public assistance in the form of Social Security
benefits.

Moreover, wife adduced no evidence husband has or will

ever have an ability to pay alimony, but instead sought to show
by testimony of husband's physicians that he was not capable of
handling his own financial affairs.

That testimony flies in the

face of any potential finding of an ability to pay on husband's
part and warrants a reversal of the alimony award.
Furthermore, if the trial court had properly considered the
purpose of alimony, it would be readily observed that, as between
these two parties, the only potential candidate for alimony is
the permanently disabled husband, not the wife.
The trial court's award of alimony is wholly unjustified on
both the facts and law and should be reversed.
Ill
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING FUTURE TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS INASMUCH AS THE ORDER FAILS TO COMPLY
WITH U.C.A. 78-3a~48(2).
U.C.A. 78-3a-48(2) provides that:
"a termination of parental rights may be ordered only
after a hearing is held specifically on the question of
terminating the rights of the parent or parents. A
verbatim record of the proceedings must be taken and
the parties must be advised of their right to
counsel..."
9

The term parental rights includes rights of reasonable
visitation.

See U.C.A. 78-3a-2(10), (14). The trial court

ordered termination of husbandfs visitation rights if his mother
abuses the minor son or "if the mother of the defendant in any
way interferes with the visitation privilege, such privilege will
be terminated." (emphasis supplied).

Not only does the trial

court's broad and all-encompassing language fail to address the
nature of any alleged interference or the best interests of the
child, but the court's automatic termination of visitation rights
also ignores the statutory language of U.C.A. 78-3a-48(2)
concerning termination of parental rights.
An even more fundamental objection to the court's order is
that it predicates husband's visitation on the conduct of a nonparty over whom he has no control.

Nowhere does the court

indicate in any of its determinations that husband can control
the conduct of his mother.

For that reason, husband should not

be punished and deprived of his constitutional right to exercise
his parental right of visitation without the benefit of a full
evidentiary hearing on the issue of his mother's conduct, vis-avis, the minor child.
CONCLUSION
The trial court inequitably and unjustly awarded all the
parties' real property proceeds.
10

Husband should be awarded

twenty-five percent (25%) of the net proceeds and this case
should be remanded for entry of an order in accordance therewith.
The award of alimony is wholly unsupported by any evidence
or findings and should be reversed in total.
The lower court's provision concerning husband's mother's
conduct and visitation rights should be modified to provide for a
full evidentiary hearing during which the issues of the minor
child's best interests, the nature of the mother's alleged
interference and the husband's ability to prevent the alleged
interference should be addressed.

The court should therefore

remand this matter for modification of the Decree in accordance
with the foregoing.
DATED this

£f)

day of r-, / x~s>

^~~u

, 1987.

Respectfully submitted,

PiHri'Krp' w. Dye
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake City, Utah

.

Cn\

DEC 18 1986

\\S\

H. Dixcn Hindioy, Clerk 3rd Disi. Court

\*y.

By —

1

. ' - . — • • >
•)

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD WtfTCIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

MARSHA DIANE RUSH,

CIVIL NO. D-85-2636

Plaintiff,
vs.
LARRY GENE RUSH,
Defendant.

1.

A divorce is granted to the plaintiff.

2.

Custody of the minor children is awarded to the plaintiff,

subject to reasonable rights of visitation at reasonable times
and places being vested in the defendant. In this regard, visitation
will not take place at the residence or home of the plaintiff,
and the defendant shall give 48 hours advance notice of when
he wishes to visit with the children.

The children shall not

be required to go on visitations with the plaintiff if they
reasonably do not desire to do so.

The minor son of the parties

may visit overnight with the defendant on those occasions when
the defendant and the minor son so agree.

The minor son is

in no way obligated to visit overnight with the defendant, and
may refuse to do so at any time.
3.

If there is any problem about abuse of the minor son

by the defendant or his mother, or if the mother of the defendant
13

RUSH V. RUSH

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

in any way interferes with the visitation privilege, such privilege
will be terminated.
4.

The defendant may drive a vehicle with the children

in said vehicle only so long as the children are comfortable
with him doing so.

In the event they express any discomfort

with his driving, he is to cease driving them immediately, and
make other arrangements for transportation.
'5.

The real property of the parties

is ordered

sold,

and the past due debts of both parties that were incurred prior
to separation, including the medical bills of the defendant
shall be paid out of the proceeds of that sale.

The balance

of the equity in said property is awarded to the plaintiff for
the purpose of her procuring housing for she and the minor children.
6.

Alimony

is awarded the plaintiff

in a sum equal to

the social security payment paid to hes as the former spouse
of a disabled person, plus $1.00^to preserve her right to alimony.
7.

Child support is awarded only in the amount of the

support benefit payable to the minor dependent children under
social security.

The defendant is ordered to assign such benefits

above-described, and do all other things necessary to assure
that the spouse and children receive the same.

The alimony

and child support are limited as set forth herein, based on
the fact that the equity of the parties in the real estate has

14

been awarded

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE THREE

RUSH V. RUSH

to the plaintiff

in lieu of any further

order of

alimony or support at this time.
8.

Each party

shall pay their

The balance

of the issues

own a t t o r n e y ' s

fees and

costs.•
9.

forth in the Stipulation

between

shall be resolved

the p a r t i e s , dated

as set

November

14, 1986.
10.

The parties

are both restrained

from harassing

each

other at all times.
11.

The p l a i n t i f f ' s

attorney

is to prepare the Findings

of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the Decree herein.
Dated this

//

da

Y

of

D^e^mber^/U

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
CLERK
'Jy

ii
Deputy Clerk
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following, this

/0

day of December, 1986:

Lee Anne Walker
Attorney for Plaintiff
2520 S. State, Suite 172
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Edward K. Brass
Attorney for Defendant
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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FilED IN CLERK'S OfFSCE
Salt Lake City Uiuh

FEB 6
LEE ANNE WALKER
Attorney for defendant
2520 S. State, Suite 172
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
(801) 486-8331

1987

h Oixcn ri-ndioy C^r* 3%d 0 st Coua
0

Deputy Jlwik

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

]I

MARSHA DIANE RUSH,
PLAINTIFF

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]

v

:

LARRY GENE RUSH,
DEFENDANT

])

JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

]I

CIVIL D85-2636

This matter came on regularly for hearing on Wednesday, the
19th day of November, at 10 a.m. and thereafter as required for
the matter

to be heard.

The

plaintiff

was

represented

by her counsel, Lee Anne Walker.

present

a i\d

Defendant was

present and represented by his counsel.
Upon the testimony of the parties and their witnesses,
exhibits received, the partial stipulation of the parties, the
argument of counsel, the Court makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The plaintiff has been a bona fide resident of Salt Lake

County for more than three months prior to commencement of this
action.
2.

The parties were married April 30, 1965, in Murray, Salt

Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

The

parties

have

three

children

marriage:
17

as issue

of this

Sharon Lynn Rush, born 6-28-1966.
Kristie Marie Rush, born 9-19-1971
Ricky Lee Rush, born 6-24-1974
There are no other children expected.

The oldest is no longer a

minor.
4.

Defendant has inflicted mental and physical cruelty on

plaintiff and the children,
distress.

causing

plaintiff

great

mental

Particularly, defendant is a head trauma patient,

having been in an accident on June 16, 1983*

Plaintiff attended

him in the hospital, and tried in every way to help him recover.
He is physically much recovered, but his attitudes and memory
span have been affected. He has become physically violent and
abusive.

He has defied plaintiff and the doctors, and seized the

income, subjecting plaintiff and the children to great risks and
financial hardships.
5.
Security
children.

Defendant is permanently disabled
benefits

for himself,

the

Plaintiff is able-bodied

have job training or skills.

and receives Social

spouse,

and

the

minor

and employed, but does not

The parties also rent a shop on the

front of their property for FIVE HUNDRED ($500.00) DOLLARS per
month.
6.

The

parties

stipulated

in

Court

that

the

personal

property and furniture should be awarded as divided.
7.

Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to be awarded the

custody of the parties1 minor children, subject to reasonable
rights of visitation at reasonable times and places bring vested
in the defendant.

In this regard, visitation will not take place
18

at t*.e residence or home of the plaintiff, and defendant shall
give 43 hours advance notice of when he wishes to visit with the
children.

The

children

shall

not

be

required

to

go on

visitations with the defendant if they reasonably do not desire
to do so.

The minor son of the parties may visit overnight with

the defendant on those occasions when the defendant and the minor
son so agree.

The minor son is in no way obligated to visit

overnight with the defendant, and may refuse to do so at any
time.
8.

If there is any problem about abuse of the minor son by

the defendant or his mother, or if the mother of the defendant in
any way interferes with the visitation privilege, such privilege
will be terminated.
9.

The defendant may drive a vehicle with the children in

said vehicle only so long as the children are comfortable wJLth
him doing so.

In the event they express any discomfort with his

driving, he is to cease driving them immediately, and make other
arrangements for transportation.
10.

The real property of the parties is ordered sold.

past due debts of both parties that were

incurred

The

prior to

separation, including the medical bills of the defendant, shall
be paid out of the proceeds of that sale.

The balance of the

equity in said property is awarded to the plaintiff for the
purpose of her procuring housing for her and the minor children.
6.

Alimony is awarded the plaintiff in a sum equal to the

monthly Social Security payment paid to her as the former spouse
of

a disabled

person,

plus $1.00 to preserve her right to

alimony.
19

7.

Child support is awarded to plaintiff only in the amount

of the support benefit payable to the minor children under Social
Security.

The defendant is ordered

to assign such benefits

above-oescribed, and do all other things necessary to assure that
the plaintiff and children receive the same.

The alimony and

child support are limited as set forth herein, based on the fact
that the equity of the parties in the real estate has been
awarded to plaintiff in lieu of any further order of alimony or
support at this time.
8.

Each party shall pay their own attorney's fees and costs

in this matter.
9.

The

Court awards the mobile home to plaintiff, the

1981 Subaru to plaintiff, and the truck to the defendant. The
parties should assume the obligations of these respective items
as awarded and hold the other harmless therefrom.
10.

The defendant is ordered to be responsible for and

hold plaintiff harmless from

any debts or judgments he incurred

since the separation of the parties and for the repair bill
incurred

for

his

truck.

The

parties

are

ordered

to be

responsible for and hold each harmless from their own debts and
obligations from the date of the divorce.
11. The parties are both restrained from harrassing each
other at all times.
From the Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce, according

to law, upon the grounds of mental cruelty, to be final upon
20

entry.
2.

The

terms

of

the

divorce

should

be based

on the

stipulations of the parties and the findings and conclusions of
the Court.
3.

If any of the Findings are conclusions of law, they

shall be deemed Conclusions.
./

DATED this

/

, 198-

day of

.

/

BY T,HE-C0URT

'RICHARD/H.//10FFAT
DISTRICT /JUDGE

ATTEST

APPROVAL AS TO FORM:

H. DIXON HINDLEY
|
CLERK
puty ClerK

EDWARD BRASS
Attorney for defendant
MAILING CERTIFICATE

I CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of these
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to defendant's counsel,
Edward K. Brass, at his office at 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake
City, UT 84102 postage prepaid through the U. S. mails this 26th
day of January, 1987.

- * * 6 / f r ^ "CUcX,£<H

"\
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FILED «rt CLERKS Q?F?C£
Salt Lake City, 'Jtah

FEB G 1987
LEE ANNE WALKER
Attorney for defendant
2520 S. State, Suite 172
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
(801) 486-8331

H Oixon rt-ndisy. i e f f 3;c D.st Court

By

fcs

G{\QXQf)&£L-.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MARSHA DIANE RUSH,

]>

PLAINTIFF

v
LARRY GENE RUSH,
DEFENDANT

DECREE OF DIVORCE

no • 3Ziu

>

jS/ w-

:>

2~/i

])

JUDGE RICHARD H.

)1

CIVIL

Z7 '

% '3<+

^

MOFFAT

D85-2-636

This matter came on regularly for hearing on Wednesday, the
19th day of November, at 10 a.m. and thereafter as required for
the

matter

represented

to be heard.

The

plaintiff

was

by her counsel, Lee Anne Walker.

present

and

Defendant was

present and represented by his counsel.
Upon the testimony of the parties and their witnesses,
exhibits received, the stipulations of the parties, the argument
of counsel, and for good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1.

Plaintiff is granted a decree of divorce, to be final

upon entry.
2.

Plaintiff is awarded the

children,
reasonable

subject
times

custody of the parties1 minor

to reasonable
and

places

bing

rights

of visitation

at

vested

in the defendant.

In this regard, visitation will not take place at the residence
or home of the plaintiff, and defendant shall give 48 hours
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advance notice of when he wishes to visit with the children.

The

children shall not be required to go on visitations with the
defendant if they reasonably do not desire to do so.

The minor

son of the parties may visit overnight with the defendant on
those occasions when the. defendant and the minor son so agree.
The minor son is in no way obligated to visit overnight with the
defendant, and may refuse to do so at any time.
3.

If there is any problem about abuse of the minor son by

the defendant or his mother, or if the mother of the defendant in
any way interferes with the visitation privilege, such privilege
will be terminated.
4.

The defendant may drive a vehicle with the children in

said vehicle only so long as the children are comfortable with
him doing so.

In the event they express any discomfort with his

driving, he is to cease driving them immediately, and make other
arrangements for transportation.
5.

The real property of the parties is ordered sold.

past due debts of both parties that were incurred

The

prior to

separation, including the medical bills of the defendant, shall
be paid out of the proceeds of that sale.

The balance of the

equity in said property is awarded to the plaintiff for the
purpose of her
6.

procuring housing for her and the minor children.

Alimony is awarded the plaintiff in a sum equal to the

monthly Social Security payment paid to her as the former spouse
of a disabled

person,

plus $1.00 to preserve

her right to

alimony.
7.

Child support is awarded to plaintiff only in the amount
23

of the support benefit payable to the minor children under Social
Security.

The defendant

is ordered

to assign such benefits

above-described, and do all other things necessary to assure that
the plaintiff and children receive the same.
8.

Each party shall pay their own attorney's fees and costs

in this matter.
9.

The

Court awards the mobile home to plaintiff, the

1981 Subaru to plaintiff, and the truck to the defendant. The
parties should assume the obligations of these respective items
as awarded and hold the other harmless therefrom.
10.

The defendant is ordered to be responsible for and

hold plaintiff harmless from

any debts or judgments he incurred

since the separation of the parties and for the repair bill
incurred

for

his

truck.

The

parties

are

ordered

to

be

responsible for and hold each harmless from their own debts ^nd
obligations from the date of the divorce.
11. The parties are both restrained from harrassing each
other at all times.
12.

The personal property and furniture is awarded as

divided.
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ATTEST
H. DiXON HINDLEY
CLERK
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APPROVAL AS TO FORM:

EDWARD BRASS
Attorney for defendant
MAILING

CERTIFICATE

I CERTIFY that I mailed

a true and

correct

copy

of this

Decree of Divorce to defendant's counsel, Edward K. Brass, at his
office

at 321 South 600 East,

Salt Lake City,

UT 84102

postage

prepaid through the U. S. mails this 26th day of January, 1987.
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Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5
U.C.A. 30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health
of parties and children - Court to have continuing jurisdiction Custody and visitation - Termination of alimony.
(1)

When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may

include in it such orders in relation to the children, property
and parties, and the maintenance and health care of the
parties and children, as may be equitable...
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Utah Code Ann. 78-3a-48
U.C.A. 78-3a-48. Termination of parental rights - Grounds
Hearing - Effect of order - Placement of child - Voluntary
petition of parent.
(2)

A termination of parental rights may be ordered

only after a hearing is held specifically on the question
of terminating the rights of the parent or parents.

A ver-

batim record of the proceedings must be taken and the parties
must be advised of their right to counsel.

No such hearing

shall be held earlier than ten days after service of summons
is completed inside or outside of the state...
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Utah Code Ann. 78-3a-2
U.C.A. 78-3a-2.
(10)

Definitions. - As used in this act:

"Residual parental rights and duties" means

those rights and duties remaining with the parent after
legal custody or guardianship, or both, have been vested in
another person or agency, including, but not limited to, the
responsibility for support, the right to consent to adoption,
the right to determine the child's religious affiliation,
and the right to reasonable visitation unless restricted by
the court.

If no guardian has been appointed, "residual

parental rights and duties" also include the right to consent
to marriage, to enlistment, and to consent to major medical,
surgical, or psychiatric treatment.
(14)

"Termination of parental rights" means the permanent

elimination of all parental rights and duties, including
residual parental rights and duties, by court order.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

MARS HA DIANE RUSH,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
VS.

LARR Y GENE RUSH,
Defendant and
Appellant.

I

CERTIFICATE OF FILING
AND SERVICE

I

Case No. 870092-CA

'

Case Priority 14.b.

'

PHILLIP W. DYER, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, Larry
Gene Rush, hereby certifies that on the

£v

day of July, 1987,

the original and seven copies of the Brief of Appellant were
filed with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals and that four copies
of the Brief of Appellant were hand-delivered to Lee Anne Walker,
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent, 2520 South State Street, Suite
172, Salt Lake City, Utah
DATED this

^d

84115.

day of ^ 7 ^ - ^

, 1987.

Respectfully submitted,

Ptfillip W. Dyer
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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